Centcom: Chopper Carrying 38 Downed By RPG, Mission Tactically Sound

Posted Oct 12, 2011 by Howard Altman

Updated Oct 12, 2011 at 08:59 PM

The Chinook CH-47D helicopter carrying 38 on an Immediate Reaction Force mission Wardak Province was shot down by a rocket propelled grenade as it approached its landing area, according to the executive summary of a U.S. Central Command investigative report on the disaster that killed everyone on board Aug. 6.

The report, compiled by BG Jeffrey N. Colt, found that the “mission, tactics and resources employed in its execution were consistent with previous special forces missions…”

The pilots were among the most respected and the aircraft was properly outfitted for the mission.

And the decision to put so many people into one chopper was “tactically sound,” Colt found.

However, Colt found that surveillance air cover was not properly placed to monitor both the outgoing Ranger team and the incoming SEALs. That was not a factor in the shoot down or crash. And, Colt found, in the future, there should be better planning of aircraft overhead to avoid tipping off the enemy.

According to the report:

This mission was to find Qari Tahir, who had assumed the leadership of the Taliban in the Tangi Valley, according to the report. Tahir was believed to have ties to senior Taliban leaders in Pakistan and the mission was to capture or kill him between Aug. 5 and Aug. 6.

The plan was to have a Ranger-led assault force – which included Afghan partners and a female cultural support team member - with a back up force of Navy SEALS, fly to Tahir’s compound, in near zero illumination, in two Chinooks and two Apaches, along with an AC-130 gunship and a “relatively robust team” of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

The two Chinooks were supposed to land and drop off the assault force, which was supposed to surround the compound, enter it, clear it and take prisoners if possible and gather intelligence.

Due to the near-zero illumination and the experience level of one non-pilot crew chief, this was deemed to be a high-risk mission by the Air Chief Commander and his aviation task force commander, according to the report. Because of the risk, the mission had to be approved by higher headquarters commander for the special ops task force and by the aviation brigade commander.

Shortly before 11 p.m. local time, the Chinooks touched down simultaneously at the landing zone, offloaded the assault force and returned to base to refuel and await possible casualty extraction.

When the assault team arrived at the compound, manned and unmanned aircraft overhead spotted several people leaving the target area. At 11:30 p.m., the Apaches spotted the Taliban fighters, armed with AK-47s and RPG launchers walking 400 meters northwest of the compound. After receiving permission to fire, the Apaches opened up with its 30 m m machine guns, killing six Taliban. Two others disappeared into the trees and were never found. Meanwhile, aircraft monitored a second group of Taliban near the compound.

At around 1 a.m. Aug. 6, commanders back at the base were readying the Immediate Reaction Force of Navy SEALs to be choppered in aboard a Chinook to assist the Ranger-led team. Planners began to look for a place to drop the SEALs close enough to cut off the escape route of any Taliban, including the leader, in an area suitable to land a Chinook.

At 1:50 a.m., commanders approved a landing zone, which was supposed to be used for a previous mission that never took place.

Around 2 a.m., aircraft spotted Taliban, which eventually became a group of about nine to 10, gathering about two kilometers from the compound.

At about the same time, the special ops task force and IRF commanders decided to increase the IRF from 17 to 32, based upon the number of enemy personnel, the need to increase the IRF’s capabilities with an Afghan partnering unit, and additional support personnel elements and the probability of daylight movement out of the area. The IRF now included 17 SEALs, five Naval Special Operations support personnel, three U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Airmen, seven Afghan soldiers and a military working dog. There was also an interpreter and five crew members for a total of 38 people on board.

The decision to put so many people on one Chinook was made to get the team there as quickly as possible while leaving “mitigating risk to a second helicopter” approaching the landing zone.

At 2:22 a.m., both Chinooks departed the forward operating base, with CW4 David R. Carter and CW2 Brian J. Nichols flying the lead chopper.

The helicopters, flying blacked out, took a different route than earlier, flying northwest into the Tangi Valley.

Six minutes from the landing zone, the trailing chopper, empty but for its crew, began circling a pre-determined point while the lead chopper headed for the landing zone.

After making its “one minute radio call” the lead Chinook descended to about 100 to 150 feet above the ground, and slowed to 50 knots as it approached the landing zone from the northwest.

As they did, an undetected group of Taliban, in a two-story mud brick building about 220 meters south of the chopper, fired two or three RPGs in rapid succession.

The first RPG missed.

But the second one hit the blades on the aft rotor assembly and exploded, compromising the structural integrity and causing a rapid chain reaction resulting in the loss of more than 10 feet of the rotor blade.

In seconds, the chopper swung violently.

The aft, then forward blade systems separated from the chopper and the main fuselage dropped straight down into a dry creek bed.

The incident took about five seconds from RPG impact to crash.

The airframe was immediately engulfed in a large fireball, followed by secondary explosions of fuel and munitions that went off for another several hours, until the flames burned out.

After discussions with medical examiner at Dover Air Force Base, BG Colt reported that the injuries sustained by all on board were immediately incapacitating and “most likely rapidly fatal.”

BG Colt found that the decision to put so many personnel aboard one aircraft was “tactically sound” and that the chopper wasn’t baited into the attack, but the Taliban were on a heightened state of alert after more than three hours of battle.

Nichols and Carter were among the most respected Chinook-qualified pilots and the aircraft was properly equipped to tackle the mission.

The report did not that the special ops task force commander, who is not named in the executive summary, did not reallocate intelligence, surveillance and recon aircraft to ensure surveillance coverage both for the Ranger team and the incoming SEALs. 

“While not a cause of the shoot-down or crash, it should be a noteworthy aspect of the compressed planning process that should be addressed in future IRF missions.”

The evidence “also disclosed that the employment of aircraft overhead prior to a helicopter insertion should be better synchronized to minimize possible early warning to the enemy of imminent ground operations.”