Centcom: Allegations of Plot By Iranians To Kill Saudi Ambassador In US No Surprise

Posted Oct 12, 2011 by Howard Altman

Updated Oct 12, 2011 at 04:19 PM

For months, the folks at Central Command have been telling me about how the “malign’ forces of Iran have been wreaking havoc throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Centcom’s leadership has been concerned, in particular, about the special forces unit of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps called the Qods Force.

“They are kind of like our special forces,” Centcom’s Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Karl Horst, told me weeks ago in his office. “What they are doing is they are training Shi’a militias in operations. They are trainers. They go out and they train Lebanese Hizballah. They train the Shi’a militias in Iraq. In Yemen. It’s a challenge for us because it is a destabilizing effect in the region.”

Now, it appears, Qods Force may be a destabilizing force a whole lot closer to home.

Tuesday, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for announced that investigators broke up a plot by a Qods Force member to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States, on U.S. soil, with the help of a Mexican drug cartel.

If true, the plot, as described in a media release by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, is disturbing on a number of levels.

First of all, it would mean that the Qods Force has opened up a whole new front it its ongoing battle against the U.S. and its interests – the U.S. itself.

It would also represent another long-time concern of some segments of the intelligence community: the direct cooperation between cartels – whose internecine warfare has caused thousands of deaths along our borders – and the Iranians and their jihadi clients.

This is not just theory. In March, I wrote about Walid Makled – called a “king among kingpins” by the U.S. Attorney who will be prosecuting the Iranians – who was recently arrested and extradited to Venezuela over the objection of U.S. officials who want to dig deeper into Makled’s claims that he was working with Iranians and jihadi groups in Venezuela to smuggle drugs. And it is no secret that the heroin trade is a primary funding source for the Taliban.

This afternoon, Horst, via email, said he the plot prosecutors say was cooked up by Qods Force for an attack on U.S. soil fits in with the way they operate.

Q:  Central Command has been warning about Iranian malign influence, often via Qods Force, for a while. How surprising is this, if true?

A: This is not at all surprising.  Iran’s malign influence in the CENTCOM AOR is a constant concern to US forces and our allies in theater.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps—Qods Force is an extension of Iran’s armed services tasked with executing Iran’s external policies and revolutionary ideology by any means possible.  It is not unusual that Iran would target Saudi and US interests.  This is not a departure for Iran’s activities.  For example, it was Iran using proxies that attacked US forces at the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, and Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. And more recently, Iranian supported Shia militias continue to attack US Forces in Iraq.

Q:  From your knowledge of the way Qods Force operates how great a departure would this represent?

A: As I said, this is consistent with Iran’s demonstrated policies.  Iran has been targeting the interests of the US and its allies throughout the region for many years.  Over the past several decades we’ve see Iranian malign influence throughout our AOR, and clearly we are dealing with an emboldened Iran.

Q:  How much would Qods Force operating in CONUS complicate the mission in the AOR?

A: I think Iran plays a very dangerous game when it attempts to export terror to the United States.  How the US could or would respond is a question for U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and law enforcement agencies at all levels in the U.S.  Regardless, CENTCOM is well aware of Qods Force’s worldwide mission.  We work closely with our interagency and coalition partners to ensure that information is shared with all organizations tasked with providing security for the US and partner nations.

Q:  Does Centcom have any knowledge of who the general, mentioned above, might be and what bombing the suspect may be referring to?

A: Because this is a US domestic case, we don’t have any additional information beyond what the Department of Justice has shared. 

Q:  How much contact does Qods Force have with drug trafficking organizations and how much does it get involved in the drug trade, either in the AOR or anywhere else?

A: That’s probably a better question for the Justice Department or DEA, but what I can tell you is that Iran is unscrupulous in developing alliances and networks in support of its terrorist and criminal activities.

Q:  Any other thoughts you can share on these allegations?

A: It is common knowledge that the Qods Force is not a rogue element of the Iranian armed forces; it is a trusted, highly trained part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps answering to the highest levels of the Iranian government. Iran’s malign influence, as we have discussed before, has been an ever present threat for our forces within the CENTCOM AOR.